

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 298615
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E.O. 11652: GDS

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SUBJECT: US-SOVIET INDIAN OCEAN TALKS

1. THIRD MEETING OF THE US-SOVIET INDIAN OCEAN TALKS WAS
HELD IN THE SOVIET EMBASSY, DECEMBER 10, AND WAS CHAIRED
BY MENDELEVICH.

2. IN OPENING STATEMENT MENDELEVICH MADE THE FOLLOWING
POINTS RELATIVE TO THE ELEMENTS OF AN AGREEMENT:

A. FORM OF THE AGREEMENT: SOVIET SIDE IS READY TO THINK
ABOUT THE USE OF SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENTS BUT WILL HAVE
TO DISCUSS WITH AUTHORITIES. FORM OF STATEMENT WILL BE
SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 298615

IMPORTANT AND THIS IS A MAJOR QUESTION. WHAT IS TO BE
FROZEN SHOULD INDICATE WHAT WILL NOT BE PRESENT IN THE
FUTURE AND AS WELL AS WHAT WAS NOT THERE BEFORE, E.G.,
STRATEGIC SUBMARINES WERE NOT THERE BEFORE.

B. SUPPORT FACILITIES FOR SUBMARINES: IN REPLY TO A US
QUESTION, MENDELEVICH STATED THAT THE USSR COULD NOT AGREE
TO A BAN ON ALL SUBMARINE SUPPORT FACILITIES AS THE SOVIET
SITUATION WAS NOT LIKE THE US SITUATION, AND THEY NEEDED
ONE, UNARMED "FLOATING BASE FACILITY; FOR CONVENTIONAL

SUBMARINES.

C. SSBN SUPPORT: SAID IT IS WELL-KNOWN THAT SSBN'S NEED CERTAIN UNDERWATER, PRE-EQUIPPED, PREARRANGED POSITIONS ON THE SEABED WHICH MAY BE IN INDIAN OCEAN. THIS IS NOT COVERED IN THE SEABED TREATY AND SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THIS AGREEMENT.

D. DISTINCTION BETWEEN ROUTINE PORT CALLS AND UTILIZATION: SOVIETS SHALL THINK OVER THIS QUESTION AND HOW IT CAN BEST BE REFLECTED IN THE TEXTS. BOTH AGREE THAT ROUTINE PORT CALLS (RPC'S) SHOULD NOT BE LIMITED. US AND SOVIET INTERPRETATION OF ROUTINE PORT CALLS MAY BE DIFFERENT. SOVIETS DO NOT HAVE BASES AND NEED MORE RPC'S. THEY HAVE GREATER PROPORTION OF AUXILIARIES WHICH MUST BE LOCATED SOMEWHERE. IN SOME FORM OR OTHER THIS MUST BE REFLECTED IN AGREEMENT.

E. EXEMPTION FOR TRANSPORT, PATROL AND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT IN ARTICLE 4 OF SOVIET TEXT: USSR WILL REVIEW THIS IDEA BUT NOTED THAT TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT ARE DIFFERENT FROM PATROL AIRCRAFT NOT ONLY IN DESIGN BUT ALSO MISSION.

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 298615

F. ADJACENT AREAS: NOTED THAT THE US WOULD STUDY SECOND SENTENCE, PARAGRAPH 1 OF ARTICLE I. THE SOVIET POSITION IS NOT RIGID AND IT SHOULD BE DISCUSSED AT THE NEXT MEETING.

G. TITLE AND ARTICLE III OF SOVIET DRAFT: WITH REFERENCE TO THE US SUGGESTION THAT THE TITLE OMIT "REDUCTIONS," AND INTERNAL ARTICLES NOT ESTABLISH GOALS FOR SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS, HE ARGUED THAT THE SOVIET DRAFT WAS SUFFICIENTLY MODEST BUT HE WAS WILLING TO LOOK FOR OTHER WORDS. THE TEXT SHOULD EXPRESS CLEARLY THE CONTINUITY OF THE PROCESS INCLUDING ACKNOWLEDGMENT THAT STABILIZATION IS ONLY A BEGINNING AND NOT AN END. STATED THAT BOTH "RESTRAINT" AND "LIMITATIONS" ARE AMBIGUOUS AND SEEMED WILLING TO ACCEPT US WORDING.

H. ALLIED FACTOR: YES, WE SHOULD EXERCISE INFLUENCE ON OTHERS SO THEY WOULD NOT OBSTRUCT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AGREEMENT, BUT USSR IS WILLING TO CONSIDER ALTERNATIVE WORDING. USSR AGREES WITH US THAT IT IS DESIRABLE OTHERS FOLLOW OUR EXAMPLE. RELIANCE ON A WITHDRAWAL CLAUSE TO TAKE CARE OF AN ALLIED BUILDUP IS "UNFAIR" TO SOVIETS WHO HAVE NO ALLIES IN THE AREA AND COULD BE BLAMED FOR WITHDRAWING FROM THE AGREEMENT BECAUSE OF ACTIONS OF US ALLIES. US NOT SUFFICIENTLY APPRECIATIVE OF SOVIET EFFORTS. "WE HAVE TRAVELED A LONG WAY TO MEET YOUR CONCERNS." REQUESTED US TO LOOK

AT THE MATTER CAREFULLY AGAIN.

I. TRANSITS: AGREED THAT A TIME FACTOR COULD BE ADDED TO THE DEFINITION. SHOULD BE DISCUSSED AT NEXT MEETING.

J. DEFINITION OF AREA: REVIEWED SOVIET ARGUMENTS FOR THEIR DEFINITION AND STATED THAT EXCLUSION OF WATERS TO THE SOUTH OF AUSTRALIA WOULD PERMIT THE US TO INCREASE SUPPORT ACTIVITIES THERE. SUGGESTED THAT THE EXPERTS
SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 298615

ON GEOGRAPHY DISCUSS AT THE NEXT ROUND.

J. DURATION: NOTED US PREFERENCE FOR FIVE YEARS AND SOVIET SUGGESTION OF THREE (WHEN THEY REALLY PREFERRED TWO), BUT STATED THAT THIS WAS NOT A SERIOUS DISAGREEMENT AND IS SUBJECT TO NEGOTIATIONS.

3. IN RESPONSE, AMBASSADOR WARNKE RESTATED US POSITION AND MADE THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL POINTS:

A. FORM OF AGREEMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENTS WOULD BE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE AGREEMENT WITH THE SAME LEGAL STATUS AS BASIC DOCUMENT. THE US VISUALIZES THE STATEMENTS AS CONTAINING DESCRIPTION OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY OF RECENT YEARS AND THE BASIC TEXT WOULD NOTE THAT WE WOULD NOT EXCEED THESE LEVELS. WITH REGARD TO THE SOVIET SUGGESTION OF INCLUDING STATEMENTS OF WHAT WAS NOT DONE IN THE PAST, THIS COULD BE AN ENDLESS PROCESS AS THERE IS NO END OF THINGS THE US DID NOT DO IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. THE US BELIEVES THAT A SPECIFIC EXCHANGE OF DATA IN THE LEVEL OF DETAIL OF THE SOVIET "PARAMETERS" IS NEITHER NECESSARY NOR DESIRABLE IN THE CONTEXT OF A STABILIZATION AGREEMENT. SUGGESTED THAT CONCENTRATION ON SHIP-DAYS AND TON-DAYS BE DELAYED UNTIL DISCUSSIONS ON REDUCTIONS.

B. RPC'S AND UTILIZATION: IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE US TO ACCEPT THE SOVIET VIEW THAT THEIR VARIOUS PORT ACTIVITIES CONSTITUTE NOTHING MORE THAN RPC'S. AGREEMENT SHOULD PREVENT PROLIFERATION OF PORT UTILIZATION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. THE CONCEPT OF RPC'S SHOULD NOT LEAD TO EXPANSION OF MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. AS TO SOVIET CLAIM THAT BECAUSE OF ASYMMETRIES THEY SHOULD BE COMPENSATED FOR WHAT THE US HAS, RESPONDED THAT ANY
SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 298615

ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT HAS TO RECOGNIZE DIFFERENCES, BUT THE BALANCE OF ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES IS NOT TO DISADVANTAGE OF USSR. THIS IS A SERIOUS ISSUE AND WE CANNOT ALLOW A LOOPHOLE THAT WOULD VITIATE OUR AGREEMENT.

C. DEFINITION OF AREA: CITED NEED FOR REALISTIC CIRCUMSCRIPTION AND NOT AN AGGRANDISEMENT OF THE AREA.

D. STRATEGIC SYSTEMS: THE SUPPLEMENTAL DOCUMENTS WILL ACCURATELY REFLECT RECENT MILITARY ACTIVITY INCLUDING THE STRATEGIC SITUATION. STATEMENTS MADE TO DATE ARE AS FAR AS US AUTHORITIES ARE WILLING TO GO IN STABILIZATION.

E. WITHDRAWAL CLAUSE AND ALLIED FACTOR: US FAVORS OMISSION OF ANY PRE-NOTIFICATION PERIOD FOR WITHDRAWAL CLAUSE; PRECEDENTS OF OTHER ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS DO NOT APPLY HERE. SOVIET USE OF ESCAPE CLAUSE IF SUPREME NATIONAL INTERESTS THREATENED BY US ALLIES WOULD BE UNDERSTOOD BY OTHERS. SOVIET ARTICLE 3 COULD BE A CAUSE OF BOTH SIDES BUILDING UP IN REACTION TO THIRD PARTIES. AN ESCAPE CLAUSE IS A DETERRENT TO THIRD PARTIES WHO COULD BE BLAMED IF THEIR ACTIVITIES THREATENED THE SUPREME INTERESTS OF ONE OF THE PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENT. WE CANNOT ACCEPT LANGUAGE WHICH SUGGESTS AN UNDERTAKING TO ENFORCE SOME SORT OF LIMITS ON OUR ALLIES.

F. EXCEPTION FOR FORCE MAJEURE AND HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES: BOTH SIDES HAVE PREVIOUSLY AGREED ON EXCEPTIONS FOR FORCE MAJEURE IN THE CASE OF TRANSITS. THE US IS CONSIDERING DESIRABILITY OF A CLAUSE THAT PROVIDES A SIMILAR EXCEPTION FOR OTHER FORCES FOR HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES. THIS CLAUSE WOULD NEED TO BE CAREFULLY WORDED SO AS NOT TO BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE TERMS OF AN AGREEMENT.

4. IN REJOINDER, MENDELEVICH COMMENTED AS FOLLOWS:
SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 298615

A. EXCEPTIONS FOR HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES: THIS IS A NEW SUBJECT WHICH COULD CREATE A LOOPHOLE OR COULD PROVIDE FOR LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENTS. CANNOT AGREE OR DISAGREE BUT MUST STUDY FURTHER.

B. DEFINITION OF AREA: EXPERTS WILL HAVE TO DEAL WITH THIS IN THE NEXT ROUND. AGREEMENT SHOULD ENSURE THAT US VISITS TO SOUTHERN AUSTRALIA REMAIN IN THE NATURE OF ROUTINE PORT CALLS.

C. TITLE AND ARTICLE III: THOUGH A PROPER COMBINATION OF THESE TWO ELEMENTS, MUST DEFINE A "PROCESS" OF STABILIZATION AND REDUCTIONS. IT IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO STATE THAT WE HOLD FUTURE DISCUSSIONS IN GOOD FAITH. WE MUST SAY MORE ABOUT AIMS AND GOALS.

D. SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENTS: NOTED US WILLINGNESS TO ADDRESS STRATEGIC SITUATION IN SUPPLEMENT. SOVIET SIDE

WELCOMED THIS AND US AGREEMENT TO EXAMINE SOVIET SUGGESTED PARAMETERS. THE PARAMETERS ARE THE SUBSTANCE OF A

SPECIFIC AGREEMENT. QUESTIONED WHY A STABILIZATION AGREEMENT NEEDS FEWER NUMBERS THAN A REDUCTION AGREEMENT AS THE SCOPE IS THE SAME.

E. PORT UTILIZATION: STABILIZATION SHOULD BE BASED ON EXISTING BALANCE. US DRAFT COULD BE INTERPRETED TO JEOPARDIZE INTERESTS OF THE OTHER SIDE AS SOVIETS NEED AUXILIARY VESSELS EVEN UNDER STABILIZATION. "NOT UTILIZE ANY NEW SUCH FACILITY" WOULD MEAN THAT AN AUXILIARY VESSEL COULD NOT MOVE FROM ONE PORT TO ANOTHER UNDER STABILIZATION. SOVIETS CANNOT ACCEPT THIS UNDER STABILIZATION.
SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 298615

TION, BUT DON'T WANT GREATER NUMBER OF AUXILIARY VESSELS THAN PRESENT. REQUESTED ANOTHER US FORMULATION WHICH WOULD NOT JEOPARDIZE INTERESTS OF OTHER PART.

F. SUPREME INTEREST CLAUSE: CLAIMED PRE-NOTIFICATION REQUIRED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF US ABILITY TO SURGE INTO INDIAN OCEAN FROM ADJACENT BASES.

G. ALLIED FACTOR: USSHOULD PONDER ARTICLE II AND ARTICLE IV. CITED HIS OWN IDEA THAT INSTEAD OF AN "EQUIVALENT" INCREASE AN "ADEQUATE" INCREASE WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATE LANGUAGE FOR PERMITTED RESPONSE TO ALLIED INCREASE.

H. CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM: BOTH AGREE THAT WE NEED SUCH A MECHANISM BUT THE US PROPOSAL THAT THE DELEGATION DISCUSSING REDUCTIONS PERFORM THIS FUNCTION MAY NOT WORK.

5. WARNKE REPLIED AS FOLLOWS:

(1) FORCE MAJEURE FOR HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES: AGREED THIS PROPOSAL WOULD HAVE TO BE CRAFTED VERY CAREFULLY. THE US HAS NO FIXED POSITION.

B. FORM OF AGREEMENT: US WILL NOT ACCEPT REDUCTIONS IN NAME OF STABILIZATION, AND THE AGREEMENT CANNOT BE OVERLY DETAILED IF IT IS TO SERVE ITS PURPOSE. ONE OF THE AGREEMENT'S GOOD POINTS IS THE SPEED AT WHICH IT CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED. DELAY COULD OCCUR IF WE GET SPECIFIC, NOTED OUR SOURCES DO NOT AGREE WITH THE FIGURES YOU GAVE IN MOSCOW. IT IS NOT A QUESTION OF GOOD FAITH, BUT PERHAPS DIFFERENCES IN TIME AND DEFINITIONS. ATTEMPTING TO REACH AGREEMENT ON SPECIFIC DETAILS WILL NOT ASSIST IN GETTING AN AGREEMENT IN A SHORT PERIOD.

C. ADJACENT AREAS AND ALLIED FACTOR: PERHAPS THE ISSUE SHOULD CAUSE US TO FOCUS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF A CONSULTA-

SECRET

PAGE 08 STATE 298615

TIVE MECHANISM TO CLARIFY ISSUES DURING THE PERIOD OF THE

AGREEMENT. THE ESSENTIAL PROBLEM WITH ARTICLE II OF THE SOVIET TEXT IS THAT NEITHER SIDE WOULD ALLOW THE BUILDUP --EITHER "EQUIVALENT" OR "ADEQUATE " OF THE OTHER SIDE'S FORCES WITHOUT REACTING AND WOULD NOT ACCEPT THAT THE BUILDUP WAS IN RESPONSE TO A THIRD COUNTRY'S ACTIONS. US WILL CONTINUE TO STUDY THIS AND POSSIBLE LANGUAGE FOR A STATEMENT HOPING FOR RESTRAINT BY OTHER PARTIES.

D. NEXT ROUND: QUESTIONED WHETHER SHARED OBJECTIVE TO MOVE FORWARD REQUIRES A MORE PERMANENT NEGOTIATING PATTERN. THE NEXT ROUND SHOULD LAST FOR ABOUT TWO WEEKS AND SHOULD LEAD TO WIDENING OF AREA OF AGREEMENT. THERE IS VALUE IN RETURNING TO CAPITALS BETWEEN ROUNDS TO ASSURE THAT APPROPRIATE DECISIONS ARE MADE. MY OWN SCHEDULE DOES NOT ALLOW FOR AN OPEN-ENDED NEGOTIATION AND SUCH A NEGOTIATION WOULD REQUIRE A CHANGE IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE US DELEGATION. CANNOT AGREE ON PRECISE DATE FOR NEXT ROUND BUT 1 FEBRUARY IS A GOOD TARGET DATE.

6. MENDELEVICH ENDED THE MEETING BY NOTING THAT IF THE NEXT ROUND CANNOT BE OPEN-ENDED, IT SHOULD BE LONGER. AGREED TO 1 FEBRUARY AS A TARGET DATE BUT SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT LIKE TO SEE THE DATE CHANGED SUBSTANTIALY. CHRISTOPHER

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